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China’s economy has been going on 30 years of rapid economic growth, to 
create a Chinese-style “growth miracle”, but problems behind growth are also worth 
pondering. This affects China’s next phase of reform and the sustainability of growth. 
China’s economic growth can be classified as local government-led 
investment-driven model of economic growth, and also government-led 
transformation growth. In this process, the local government-led and state-owned 
monopoly is typical features of China’s economic transformation. In many cases, the 
local government-led growth and investment behavior is to operate through 
state-owned monopoly, the relationship between the local government and 
state-owned monopoly growing beyond the economic attributes, but rather is an 
administrative relationship. Well, research on growth issues can not fail to consider 
the impact of state-owned monopoly, especially that by the local government 
protection and intervention. This is why the paper studies growth issues from the 
combined perspective of local government-led and state-owned monopoly. In China, 
the combination of local government-led and state-owned monopoly will lead 
China’s economic growth to what kind of development track? The paper is mainly to 
explore how they affect economic growth by defining government-led connotation to 
provide a logical interpretation for many reform’s phenomenon, and then expand 
people’s awareness and correct some misunderstanding in the reform process.  
The reform went today, that government control of state-owned monopoly 
increased rather than decreased made it produce a variety of negative effects on 
economic growth. This paper is to answer, “What kind of development track the 
local government-led combined with state-owned monopoly will lead economic 
growth to?” To achieve this objective, we tease out based on realistic observation: 
First, a large number of state-owned monopoly enjoy government incentives and 













discrimination and restrictions, such as industry bannered, resource to obtain and so 
on. Government taking good care of state-owned monopoly is a violation of other 
private enterprises without the opportunity to work with power, and thus 
government-led combining with state-owned monopoly becomes the institutional 
barriers impeding the development of private economy. Second, under the incentive 
goal of government binary paradox, competition among local governments and their 
preference for capital-intensive industries will lead to industry overcapacity, 
industrial structure imbalance; and more efforts government controls state-owned 
monopoly, more serious state-owned monopolies invest excessively, and thus hinders 
industrial structure’s upgrading. Third, government-led economic growth will make 
misallocation of resources distort its normal price. Enormous economic value of 
resources which are granted to state-owned monopoly unpaid or at a low price 
become state-owned monopoly’s “high profits” which is eventually seized and 
divided up, widening the gap between the rich and the poor. The negative impact 
which the local government-led combing with state-owned monopoly has is so 
outstanding, why local governments still enjoy it? We know local governments like 
any social groups need consider their own and jurisdiction’s interest. The problem is 
that government officer fight for their interests in what institutional environment. To 
set the appropriate institution which makes local and overall achieve “incentive 
compatible” requires the central government to do the right incentives. Central 
transfers are one of the main way which the central government regulates local 
government behavior, therefore, in the seventh chapter, we explore impact of the 
central government’s institutional decisions on local government behavior and 
central transfer’s efficiency issues by comparison the contract system with the 
tax-sharing system. 
We believe that local government-led development model’s drawbacks are more 
and more significant with mature market environment through a series of studies. 
Pure state-owned monopoly has little risk, but the combination of government and 














regard, our policy implication is very clear, that is, to eliminate administrative 
monopoly by separating state-owned monopoly from government, to speed up the 
process of market-oriented reforms and transform government functions, eventually 
complete the transition from government-led market economy to market-oriented 
market economy. 
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